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I.

INTRODUCTION

Imagine that you are in a car accident, and the other driver sues you for
negligence. Not knowing any lawyers, you search the Internet and hire a
local attorney who describes himself as the best defense attorney in the state,
is not terribly expensive, and seems to be a nice enough guy. You sit back,
relax, and try to be as patient as possible while your new lawyer clears your
name.
However, just as you start to feel confident that your case will finally
come to a favorable conclusion, you receive a letter in the mail from the
county courthouse alerting you that you owe $50,000 in damages to the
person who sued you. You try to contact your attorney to see what
happened—when hired, he assured you that he would take care of
everything and that you needn’t worry about the proceedings—but he can no
longer be found. You finally drive to the courthouse and ask the clerk why
you owe so much money. The clerk informs you that the opposing party
filed a motion for summary judgment seeking $50,000, but your attorney did
not appear on your behalf at the hearing on the motion. Consequently, the
judge entered a default judgment against you,1 and you are forced to pay the
damages sought by the opposing party.
You try to sue your attorney for malpractice, but upon inspection, you
find out that he has no insurance. So, in a last-ditch effort to stem the tide of
impending debt, you hire new counsel and ask a judge to vacate the default
judgment on the grounds that your previous attorney did not sufficiently
represent you.2 The judge upholds the default judgment, and you confusedly
ask your new attorney exactly how the judge could rule that way.
1. A default judgment is “[a] judgment entered against a defendant who has failed to plead or
otherwise defend against the plaintiff’s claim.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 480 (9th ed. 2009).
2. Courts can vacate judgments and orders by utilizing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).
FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b). This topic will be taken up in more detail in Part II.B–C.
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“The judge couldn’t do anything about it,” your new attorney responds.
“The law says that you are bound by your first attorney’s actions since you
voluntarily chose to hire him. I’m sorry, but you have to pay that money.”
Although a court ruling such as this may seem to be unfair and an overly
literal interpretation of the principles of a society that values an adversarial
legal system, it is not entirely uncommon.3 Some courts have held that an
attorney’s misconduct can never be used as a basis for vacating a civil
judgment, and, as such, that a client is always bound by the acts of an
attorney who has represented him.4 Moreover, other courts have explicitly
refused to address the question whether attorney misconduct can provide a
ground for vacating civil judgments, often leaving clients in the same
position they would have been in had the court explicitly stated that they
were bound by their attorneys’ actions.5 The result is that many clients are
left without a remedy they can resort to in order to get relief from judgments
entered against them when they had been represented by terribly deficient
attorneys.6
The Supreme Court, however, recently decided two cases that give hope
to clients afflicted with incompetent attorneys.7 In Holland v. Florida and
Maples v. Thomas, cases involving two different habeas corpus petitioners,
the Court outlined a standard known as “attorney abandonment,” which
effectively states that clients are not bound by the acts or omissions of
attorneys who have abandoned them.8 Although created in a criminal
procedure context, attorney abandonment must logically extend to the civil
realm,9 a consequence that means all federal courts in civil cases must
necessarily have the power to relieve abandoned clients from the conduct—
or lack thereof—of their absent attorneys.10 This Article argues that Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) (Rule 60(b)(6)) is the only remedy that
courts can always rely on to enforce this power.11 The universal availability

3. See, e.g., cases cited infra Part II.C.2.
4. See infra Part II.C.2.
5. See infra Part II.C.4.
6. See, e.g., Bakery Mach. & Fabrication, Inc. v. Traditional Baking, Inc., 570 F.3d 845, 848
(7th Cir. 2009) (“[A]ll of the attorney’s misconduct . . . becomes the problem of the client.”).
7. See Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912 (2012); Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010).
8. Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 924; Holland, 560 U.S. 659–60 (Alito, J., concurring).
9. See infra Part IV.
10. See infra Part V.
11. See infra Part V.
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of this statutory rule, which states that courts can vacate judgments against
parties “for any . . . reason that justifies relief,”12 ensures that courts can
safeguard clients from the conduct of attorneys who have abandoned them.13
Part II of this Comment provides an overview of the distinct models the
Supreme Court has utilized to evaluate attorney misconduct and the
circumstances that bind clients to that misconduct.14 Part II also describes in
detail the uses of Rule 60(b)(6) and the circuit split prior to Holland and
Maples concerning the interaction between Rule 60(b)(6) and attorney
misconduct.15 Part III thoroughly analyzes Holland, Maples, and the
attorney abandonment standard these two cases jointly created.16 Part IV
contends that the Supreme Court likely intended for this attorney
abandonment standard to apply in the civil context.17 Part V consequently
argues that whenever a court finds that a client was abandoned in a civil suit,
Holland and Maples mandate that the court must necessarily have the power
to vacate any judgment against that client by utilizing Rule 60(b)(6).18 Part
VI returns to the circuit split described in Part II, shows how the circuit split
is cured when courts always have the ability to vacate judgments against
abandoned clients by utilizing Rule 60(b)(6), and outlines how each of the
circuits must alter their jurisprudence to reflect Holland and Maples.19 Part
VII acknowledges some lingering questions that Congress and future courts
must answer because of Holland and Maples.20 Part VIII concludes.21
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF ATTORNEY MISCONDUCT, RULE 60(b)(6), AND THE
CIRCUIT SPLIT CAUSED BY THEIR INTERACTION
A. The Historical Models for Attorney Misconduct in the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has traditionally employed two distinct analytical

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
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models when deciding issues of attorney misconduct22: the performancebased model23 and the relationship-based model.24 Generally, the Court has
used the performance-based model only when a criminal defendant is
guaranteed the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment.25 Conversely,
when a person is not guaranteed this right to counsel—including any person
that is a party to a civil lawsuit—the Court has used the relationship-based
model.26
1. The Performance-Based Model
The performance-based model “evaluates the level and quality of work
an attorney has done on a client’s behalf.”27 The focal point of this model is
just as it sounds: the performance of the client’s attorney.28 If the attorney’s
conduct falls below a certain level of reasonable acceptability,29 then the
client will no longer be bound by the attorney’s actions.30 If, however, the

22. Wendy Zorana Zupac, Note, Mere Negligence or Abandonment? Evaluating Claims of
Attorney Misconduct After Maples v. Thomas, 122 YALE L.J. 1328, 1335 (2013).
23. See infra Part II.A.1.
24. See infra Part II.A.2.
25. Zupac, supra note 22, at 1332. Because the right to counsel only attaches to criminal
defendants, the performance-based model is outside the scope of this Article: Rule 60(b)(6) only
applies to civil lawsuits, where a party does not have a guaranteed right to counsel. See U.S. CONST.
amend. VI. For that reason, this Article will only briefly discuss the performance-based model. See
infra Part II.A.1.
26. Zupac, supra note 22, at 1332.
27. Id. at 1335.
28. Id. at 1337.
29. This level of reasonable acceptability was first described in Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687 (1984). The Strickland standard states the following:
A convicted defendant’s claim that counsel’s assistance was so defective . . . has two
components. First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient.
This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second,
the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This
requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a
fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.
Id. Put differently, the attorney’s performance must fall “below an objective standard of
reasonableness” as governed by “prevailing professional norms,” and it must have actually
prejudiced the defendant in some way. Id. at 688.
30. Zupac, supra note 22, at 1337; see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (holding that when
criminal defendants meet both requirements of the Strickland standard, they will not be bound by the
deficient conduct of their attorneys).
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attorney’s conduct is not sufficiently deficient, then the client will remain
bound by the attorney’s actions.31
The Supreme Court has only used the performance-based model when a
defendant is guaranteed the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment of
the United States Constitution.32 Because the Sixth Amendment only applies
to criminal defendants,33 the Court has held that the right to counsel—and
therefore the performance-based model—only applies in a very limited
number of situations.34 Notably, this means that the Court has never, and
will never, use the performance-based model to decide matters of attorney
misconduct in civil cases.35
2. The Relationship-Based Model
On the other hand, the relationship-based model “examines the nature of
the relationship between the lawyer and the client.”36 It is based on agency
31. Zupac, supra note 22, at 1337; see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
32. Zupac, supra note 22, at 1332; see also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (“So
long as a defendant [who is guaranteed the right to counsel] is represented by counsel whose
performance is not constitutionally ineffective under the standard established in Strickland v.
Washington, we discern no inequity in requiring him to bear the risk of attorney error.” (citation
omitted)).
33. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” (emphasis added)).
34. A criminal defendant has a right to counsel in all felony cases and in his first appeal of right.
See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (“[I]n our adversary system of criminal justice,
any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless
counsel is provided for him.”); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963) (“But where the
merits of the one and only appeal an indigent has as of right are decided without benefit of counsel,
we think an unconstitutional line has been drawn between rich and poor.”). However, a criminal
defendant does not have a right to counsel in “appeals to the state’s highest court or in filing a
petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.” Zupac, supra note 22, at 1334; see also
Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 616–17 (1974) (“This Court’s review, much like that of the Supreme
Court of North Carolina, is discretionary . . . .”). Furthermore, a criminal defendant can mount a
“collateral attack” in a state trial court for postconviction relief and also petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in the appropriate federal district court. Zupac, supra note 22, at 1334. In these situations,
the criminal defendant is also not guaranteed a right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. See
Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987) (“We have never held that prisoners have a
constitutional right to counsel when mounting collateral attacks upon their convictions . . . .”).
35. See Zupac, supra note 22, at 1332. This has bearing on Rule 60(b)(6) because the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure only apply in civil lawsuits. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(6). Accordingly, Rule
60(b)(6) will never implicate the performance-based model. See infra Part II.A.2 (describing how
the relationship-based model will always govern in civil cases).
36. Zupac, supra note 22, at 1335.
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law and premised on the fact that the attorney is the agent of the client.37
Therefore, under this model, clients traditionally remain bound by their
attorney’s conduct regardless of the degree of the attorney’s negligence.38
The relationship-based model was first articulated in Link v. Wabash
Railroad Co.,39 a Supreme Court case arising out of a civil lawsuit in which
the Court established the general rule that clients should be held responsible
for their attorneys’ conduct regardless of how negligent the conduct was.40
In deciding the case, the Court reasoned:
Petitioner voluntarily chose this attorney as his representative in the
action, and he cannot now avoid the consequences of the acts or
omissions of this freely selected agent. Any other notion would be
wholly inconsistent with our system of representative litigation, in
which each party is deemed bound by the acts of his lawyeragent . . . .41
The Court later reaffirmed this general rule in Coleman v. Thompson,42
37. Id. at 1137; see also Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.01 (“Agency is the fiduciary
relationship that arises when one person (a ‘principal’) manifests assent to another person (an
‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control, and
the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act.”).
38. Prior to the Court’s decisions in Holland and Maples, attorney abandonment was available to
relieve clients from the conduct of their negligent attorneys under the relationship-based model in
only some circuits. See infra Parts II.C.1, II.C.3, III. As such, before these two decisions, and
depending on the court, clients were sometimes completely bound by their attorneys’ conduct in
situations where the relationship-based model governed. See infra Part II.C.2.
39. 370 U.S. 626 (1962).
40. See id. at 633–34. Link involved a collision between Link’s car and one of Wabash’s trains.
Id. at 627. Six years after this collision, the district court scheduled a pretrial conference to take
place on October 12. Id. At 10:45 a.m. on the day of the pretrial conference, Link’s attorney phoned
Wabash’s attorney and told him that he would not be at the pretrial hearing because he was in
Indianapolis “preparing papers to file with the (Indiana) Supreme Court.” Id. at 627–28. Link’s
attorney did, however, notify both the opposing attorney and the court that he could be available the
next day if the pretrial conference could be rescheduled. Id. at 628. After waiting for two hours, the
district court dismissed the action because Link’s counsel failed to provide a reasonable basis for not
appearing. Id. at 628–29. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
dismissal. Id. at 629.
41. Id. at 633–34.
42. 501 U.S. 722 (1991). Roger Coleman was convicted of rape and capital murder in Buchanan
County, Virginia, and he was sentenced to death. Id. at 726–27. The Virginia Supreme Court
affirmed both the conviction and sentence, and the Supreme Court of the United States denied
certiorari. Id. at 727. Thereafter, Coleman filed a collateral attack in Buchanan County Court
alleging several habeas corpus claims. Id. After several days of review, the court ruled against
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where it held that agency principles—and therefore the relationship-based
model43—apply in cases where the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel does
not arise.44 In so ruling, the Court noted that using a performance-based
model in such situations “would be contrary to well-settled principles of
agency law.”45 Consequently, the Coleman ruling, combined with the
underlying reasoning in Link,46 established a relationship-based model for
measuring attorney misconduct in all civil cases and in criminal appeals
where the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel does not apply.47
The Link and Coleman decisions, however, have not been received
without scrutiny.48 In fact, many circuit courts have tried to lessen the

Coleman on each claim. Id. Coleman filed a notice of appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court, but
Coleman did so thirty-three days after the Buchanan County Court entered judgment. Id. The
Virginia Supreme Court rules mandated that notices of appeal must be filed within thirty days of a
judgment. Id. For that reason, the Virginia Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. Id. After filing
another petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court, Coleman’s case eventually came before
the United States Supreme Court, which established the rule described above in the accompanying
text. Id. at 728–29, 753.
43. See supra notes 36–38 and accompanying text for a discussion of the principles of the
relationship-based model.
44. Zupac, supra note 22, at 1342; see also Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753 (“Attorney ignorance or
inadvertence is not ‘cause’ because the attorney is the petitioner’s agent when acting, or failing to
act, in furtherance of the litigation, and the petitioner must ‘bear the risk of attorney error.’” (quoting
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986))). Once again, Coleman involved a situation where the
client did not have a right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. See supra note 42. Accordingly,
it can reasonably be inferred that the Coleman Court meant for the relationship-based model to apply
only in cases where the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel does not arise, especially because the
Court explicitly mentioned Murray and its use of the performance-based model. See Coleman, 501
U.S. at 754 (“[A]s [Murray] explains, ‘if the procedural default is the result of ineffective assistance
of counsel, the Sixth Amendment itself requires that responsibility for the default be imputed to the
State.’ In other words, it is not the gravity of the attorney’s error that matters, but that it constitutes
a violation of petitioner’s right to [effective assistance of] counsel . . . .” (emphasis added) (citation
omitted)).
45. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 754 (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency § 242 (1958)).
46. See supra text accompanying note 41.
47. A relationship-based model will therefore apply, for example, in collateral attacks and
petitions for a writ of habeas corpus. See supra note 34.
48. In Link, Justice Black strongly dissented to the majority’s ruling because he believed it was
too extreme and inflexible. See Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 644–55 (1962) (Black, J.,
dissenting) (“One may readily accept the statement that there are circumstances under which a client
is responsible for the acts or omissions of his attorney. But it stretches this generalized statement too
far to say that he must always do that.”). Furthermore, Justice Blackmun authored a strong dissent
against the majority opinion in Coleman, stating that “the Court’s determination that ineffective
assistance of counsel cannot constitute cause of a procedural default in a state postconviction
proceeding is patently unfair.” 501 U.S. at 774 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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seemingly inflexible nature of the relationship-based model and the oftenunjust effects it has on clients by resorting to the courts’ equitable powers.49
The weapon of choice employed by these courts is Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b)(6).50
B. Rule 60(b)(6) as a Potential Tool
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) gives a court the power to
“relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding.”51 Obviously, such a broad grant of power, if unchecked, could
be a potential ground for abuse and could give judges too much discretion in
the outcome of a case.52 Therefore, Rule 60(b) provides that relief from a
judgment is only appropriate for one of six reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly
discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);53
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; (4) the
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or
discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed
or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6)
any other reason that justifies relief.54
While courts have the power to vacate judgments under Rule 60(b), they

49. Zupac, supra note 22, at 1362; see also infra Parts II.C.1, II.C.3.
50. Zupac, supra note 22, at 1362; see also infra Parts II.B–C.1, II.C.3.
51. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b).
52. See Seven Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi, 635 F.2d 396, 401 (5th Cir. 1981) (“This is not to say that
final judgments should be lightly reopened. The desirability of order and predictability in the
judicial process calls for the exercise of caution in [Rule 60(b)] matters.” (citing Fackelman v. Bell,
564 F.2d 734, 736 (5th Cir. 1977))).
53. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(b) states that “[a] motion for a new trial must be filed no
later than 28 days after the entry of judgment.”
54. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b). In addition to proving one of these six categories, the moving party
must file the motion for relief within a reasonable time. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(c) (“A motion under
Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time—and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) no more than a
year after the entry of the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding.”). For the purposes of
this Article, however, a discussion of this time requirement is unnecessary.
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are not mandated to do so.55 Indeed, the rule itself was created so that courts
could balance “the conflicting principles that litigation must be brought to an
end and that justice should be done.”56 That being the case, courts generally
apply Rule 60(b) liberally when it involves a case that has not been heard on
its merits or when the movant has a meritorious defense.57
But a much stricter standard applies when the sixth clause of Rule 60(b)
is at issue.58 A type of “catchall” provision,59 Rule 60(b)(6) gives a court the
power to vacate a judgment “whenever that action is appropriate to
accomplish justice.”60 It was added as part of the 1948 amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,61 and it has been described as “an
unprecedented addition to the Rules” because of its broad reach.62 This
broad reach, however, is counteracted by a stringent standard for use entitled
the “extraordinary circumstances” test.63 Essentially, the test requires that if
relief would have initially been available under one of the first five clauses
of Rule 60(b), then Rule 60(b)(6) cannot be used unless the movant can
show that extraordinary circumstances are present.64
55. See FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b) (“On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its
legal representative . . . .” (emphasis added)). Therefore, situations arise where it would be
inequitable to either grant or deny relief. See, e.g., W. Union Tel. Co. v. Dismang, 106 F.2d 362,
364 (10th Cir. 1939) (“An application to open, vacate, or set aside a judgment is within the sound
legal discretion of the trial court and its action will not be disturbed by an appellate court except for
a clear abuse of discretion. It is an abuse of discretion, however, to open or vacate a judgment where
the moving party shows no legal ground therefor or offers no excuse for his own negligence or
default.”); Hopkins v. Coen, 431 F.2d 1055, 1059 (6th Cir. 1970) (“[W]here verdicts in the same
case are inconsistent on their faces, indicating that the jury was either in a state of confusion or
abused its power, a motion to alter or amend a judgment, for new trial, or for relief from the
judgment, if timely made, is not discretionary.”).
56. 11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2851 (3d ed.
2014).
57. Id. § 2857.
58. See infra notes 63–64 and accompanying text.
59. WRIGHT, supra note 56, § 2857.
60. Id. § 2864.
61. Id.
62. Note, Federal Rule 60(b): Relief from Civil Judgments, 61 YALE L.J. 76, 81 (1952).
63. WRIGHT, supra note 56, § 2864.
64. Id. To be even more precise, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in this area is much more
nuanced than the “extraordinary circumstances” test suggests. See id. First, the “extraordinary
circumstances” test generally only applies when relief is sought a year after a judgment has been
entered. Id. This is due to the fact that it is generally not difficult to apply Rule 60(b) when relief is
sought within a year because “it is not important to decide whether the motion in fact comes under
clause (6) or under one of the earlier clauses.” Id. However, because the time requirement of Rule
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What constitutes “extraordinary circumstances” has been a source of
disagreement among the courts.65 It is a fairly unclear standard that has been
found to apply in only several situations.66 One of the biggest examples of
such a disagreement to emerge among the courts is whether attorney
misconduct can qualify as an extraordinary circumstance justifying relief
under Rule 60(b)(6).67 On one hand, Rule 60(b)(6) would seem to be an
ideal tool for such a situation because it would relieve helpless clients from
judgments that resulted from the incompetent acts of their attorneys.68 On
the other hand, the relationship-based model established by the Supreme
60 is outside the scope of this Article, see supra note 54, this Article will assume for the purposes of
simplicity that any ground for relief under Rule 60(b), regardless of whether or not it was brought
within a year, invokes the extraordinary circumstances test. For a more detailed discussion of the
time requirements of Rule 60(b)(6), see WRIGHT, supra note 56, § 2864.
Second, the “extraordinary circumstances” test is not the only test that the Supreme Court
uses: it also employs the “other reasons” test. See id. The “other reasons” test, unlike the
“extraordinary circumstances” test, states that “if the movant clearly demonstrates some ‘other
reason’ justifying relief outside of the earlier [five] clauses in the rule, then the ‘extraordinary
circumstances’ test is not invoked.” Id. In other words, the “extraordinary circumstances” test arises
when one of the earlier five clauses of Rule 60(b) is invoked, but the “other reasons” test applies
when one of the earlier five clauses is not invoked. See id. In reality, however, the difference
between these two tests is likely a legal fiction: the “other reasons” that courts have found to satisfy
the “other reasons” test “are more likely egregious forms of conduct covered under another clause of
Rule 60(b).” Id. That is, these “other reasons” are simply the most extraordinary of the
extraordinary circumstances. See id. For example—and highly relevant to this Article—one of
these “other reasons” that courts have found is attorney abandonment. Id. A regular attorney
blunder would generally “fit readily within the grounds of mistake, inadvertence, and excusable
neglect set out in clause (1)” of Rule 60(b). Id. However, when attorney misconduct becomes so
egregious so as to constitute abandonment, some courts have held that Rule 60(b)(6) is a ground for
relief. See infra Parts II.C.1, II.C.3. Viewed from this perspective, attorney abandonment is simply
an extension of a mistake under Rule 60(b)(1) that evolved into an extraordinary circumstance
warranting relief under Rule 60(b)(6). See WRIGHT, supra note 56, § 2864. Therefore, for the sake
of simplicity and consistency, this Article assumes that only the “extraordinary circumstances” test
governs because, in reality, it is essentially the same as the “other reasons” test. See id.
65. See WRIGHT, supra note 56, § 2851 (noting that cases decided under Rule 60(b)(6) have been
in conflict and inconsistent). Even more frustrating is that courts have muddled the jurisprudence of
the first five clauses under Rule 60(b) with the jurisprudence that should have been restricted to
clause Rule 60(b)(6) alone. Id. § 2857. As a result, the entire case law surrounding Rule 60(b) is a
rather confusing area for courts. See id.
66. These situations include, for example, “cases in which there was inaction by the government
and unusual delays by the courts, and when there is a strong public interest in the case and the
conduct of the parties is egregious.” Id. § 2864; see also, e.g., Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition
Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 864 (1988); Menier v. United States, 405 F.2d 245, 248 (5th Cir. 1968); Bros,
Inc. v. W.E. Grace Mfg. Co., 320 F.2d 594, 609–10 (5th Cir. 1963).
67. See infra Part II.C.
68. See FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(6).
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Court in Link and Coleman would seem to stand, at least at first glance, as a
firm roadblock to such relief.69 As a result, the circuit courts have developed
four distinct approaches to tackle this problem. 70
C. The Circuit Split over Rule 60(b)(6) as a Remedy for Attorney
Misconduct
1. The Gross Negligence Circuits
Some circuit courts have held that gross attorney negligence satisfies
Rule 60(b)(6).71 The reasoning of these courts is that in situations where the
first five clauses of Rule 60(b) should apply but cannot,72 extreme
misconduct by an attorney that exceeds ordinary negligence and goes so far
as to qualify as “gross negligence”73 is sufficiently “extraordinary” to qualify
for relief under clause (6).74 Notably, attorney abandonment is not a

69. See supra Part II.A.2.
70. See infra Part II.C.
71. See, e.g., Cmty. Dental Servs. v. Tani, 282 F.3d 1164, 1170 (9th Cir. 2002); Boughner v.
Sec’y of Health, Educ., & Welfare, 572 F.2d 976, 978 (3rd Cir. 1978) (“We reverse, however, on the
basis that the motion to vacate should have been granted under Rule 60(b)(6). The conduct of [the
lawyer] indicates neglect so gross that it is inexcusable.” (emphasis added)); Jackson v. Wash.
Monthly Co., 569 F.2d 119, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding that relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is
appropriate when an attorney acts “grossly rather than just mildly negligent toward his client”). It is
also likely that the Sixth Circuit follows this standard even though it does not explicitly use the term
“gross negligence.” See Fuller v. Quire, 916 F.2d 358, 359, 361 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting relief for plaintiff under Rule 60(b)(6) for the
“inexcusable misconduct of his attorney” when the lawyer did not appear on behalf of the client at
hearings and would not respond to the client’s inquiries). The Fourth Circuit, meanwhile, has never
explicitly vacated a judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) based on alleged attorney misconduct, but it has
suggested that it would likely follow the gross negligence standard if it did. See Smith v. Bounds,
813 F.2d 1299, 1304–05 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding that an attorney’s neglect was so deplorable that it
would likely warrant relief under Rule 60(b)(6), but denying relief on different grounds).
72. This would mainly be in a situation where the one-year statute of limitations under Rule
60(c) had ran in full and a client could no longer seek relief under Rule 60(b)(1) for her attorney’s
misconduct. See supra note 54. However, as previously stated, the time requirement is outside the
scope of this Article, so it will be taken for granted that the first step of the “extraordinary
circumstances” test is satisfied. See supra note 64.
73. Gross negligence arises when “the element of culpability which characterizes all negligence
is magnified to a high degree as compared with that present in ordinary negligence.” 57A AM. JUR.
2D Negligence § 227 (2014).
74. WRIGHT, supra note 56, § 2864; see also infra notes 78–88 and accompanying text.
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requirement per se in these circuits.75 While verdicts granting relief under
Rule 60(b)(6) in these courts can and often do involve attorney
abandonment, these courts can also theoretically grant relief under Rule
60(b)(6) where the attorney acted grossly negligent but did not abandon his
client.76 In this regard, these circuit courts have the most flexible approach
to the interaction between attorney misconduct and Rule 60(b)(6).77
In Community Dental Services v. Tani,78 for instance, the Ninth Circuit
joined the majority of the other circuits and held that an attorney’s gross
negligence is an extraordinary circumstance that is a ground for equitable
relief under Rule 60(b)(6).79 Tani involved a lawsuit for trademark
infringement by Community Dental Services (CDS) against Stuart Tani.80
Tani’s counsel repeatedly failed to give a copy of Tani’s answer to the
complaint to CDS, missed court-ordered conference calls, and failed to file a
written memorandum in opposition to CDS’s motion for a default
judgment.81 As a result of this non-responsiveness, the trial court granted a
default judgment against Tani.82 Tani subsequently sought out a new lawyer
75. See, e.g., Tani, 282 F.3d at 1169 (holding that a client need only “demonstrate[] gross
negligence on the part of his counsel” to qualify for relief under Rule 60(b)(6)). To be sure, the
court made no mention that a party must prove attorney abandonment in any form, see id., even
though in this particular case the court decided that the attorney “virtually abandoned” his client. Id.
at 1170; see also infra notes 78–90 and accompanying text.
76. See, e.g., Jackson, 569 F.2d at 122. In Jackson, the court held that the fact that the attorney
“misled the client by reassuring him that the litigation was continuing smoothly when in fact it was
suffering severely from lack of attention” was a factor that supported granting relief under Rule
60(b)(6). Id. The court never characterized this conduct as any type of “abandonment,” but it still
found that the lawyer acted in a grossly negligent manner that demanded relief. Id. at 122–23.
However, this distinction between gross negligence and attorney abandonment is likely only
a legal fiction because, in reality, any type of gross attorney negligence that justifies relief under
Rule 60(b)(6) can also be characterized as attorney abandonment. Compare id., with Tani, 282 F.3d
at 1170–71 (holding that an attorney “virtually abandoned” his client when the lawyer told the client
that the case was proceeding properly when, in reality, it was proceeding abysmally). The
implications of these holdings in light of Holland and Maples are discussed in further detail in Part
VI.A.
77. See infra Part II.C.2–3 for a discussion of stricter approaches.
78. This case was chosen because of its clear and detailed reasoning of the court’s decision to
allow Rule 60(b)(6) as grounds for relief for egregious attorney misconduct. See infra notes 85–90
and accompanying text. Cases from other circuits have held similarly and are also insightful. See
supra note 71.
79. 282 F.3d at 1169.
80. Id. at 1166.
81. Id. at 1167.
82. Id.
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and brought a new lawsuit seeking relief from the default judgment.83 The
district court denied relief, reasoning that “the acts and omissions of
counsel . . . were chargeable to Tani.”84
In reversing the decision of the trial court, the Ninth Circuit noted that
“judgment by default is an extreme measure” and that cases should be
decided on the merits whenever possible.85 More importantly, the court
explicitly referenced Link and held that it “does not serve as a barrier to
establishing the rule that gross negligence by a party’s counsel may
constitute ‘extraordinary circumstances’ under Rule 60(b)(6).”86 According
to the court, this was because “the [Link] Court expressly declined to state
whether it would have held that the district court abused its discretion if the
issue had arisen in the context of a motion under Rule 60(b).”87 The Tani
court thus took advantage of the Supreme Court’s indecision regarding
equitable relief and explicitly held that Rule 60(b)(6) can be used by a client
for relief from her attorney’s conduct so long as that conduct was grossly
negligent.88 Applying this new rule to the case at hand, the court noted that
the attorney’s gross negligence was so extreme that he “virtually
abandoned” Tani.89 The Ninth Circuit, therefore, held that the default
judgment should be vacated.90
2. The No Relief Circuits
The Seventh Circuit, on the other hand, has held that Rule 60(b)(6) is
not an appropriate basis for relief from attorney misconduct no matter how
egregiously the attorney has acted.91 The logic behind this is that even if an
83. Id.
84. Id. In other words, the court was relying on the relationship-based model espoused by the
Supreme Court in Link and Coleman. See id.; see also supra Part II.A.2.
85. Tani, 282 F.3d at 1170.
86. Id.
87. Id. (citing Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 635–36 (1962)).
88. Id. The court noted that gross negligence “signif[ies] a greater, and less excusable, degree of
negligence” when compared with ordinary negligence. Id. In light of the Supreme Court’s recent
decisions in Maples and Holland, gross negligence can be equated with attorney abandonment in
most, but not all, cases. See supra note 76 and infra Parts III, VI.A.
89. Tani, 282 F.3d at 1170.
90. Id.
91. See, e.g., United States v. 8136 S. Dobson St., 125 F.3d 1076 (7th Cir. 1997); United States
v. 7108 W. Grand Ave., 15 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 1994). It is also likely that the First Circuit currently
holds this position, although it has not closed the possibility of changing its jurisprudence. See KPS
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attorney’s performance is abysmal, the relationship-based model outlined in
Link and Coleman bars any consideration of Rule 60(b)(6) as an avenue to
relief.92
The first time the Seventh Circuit explicitly expressed this view was in
United States v. 7108 West Grand Avenue.93 In this case, the Federal
Government began forfeiture proceedings against three parcels of property
belonging to a husband and wife.94 The attorney retained by the couple
failed to file timely claims on behalf of the husband for any of the three
properties and only filed a timely claim on behalf of the wife for one of the
properties.95 The situation worsened when the trial court granted a motion
for default judgment against the couple after neither the lawyer nor the wife
appeared at the hearing for the motion.96 Accordingly, the couple, with the
help of new counsel, attempted to seek relief from the default judgment by
utilizing Rule 60(b) and claiming that their previous attorney had acted in a
grossly negligent manner.97
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the trial court’s decision not to allow the

& Assocs., Inc. v. Designs By FMC, Inc., 318 F.3d 1, 16–17 (1st Cir. 2003) (noting that the First
Circuit has always “turned a deaf ear to the plea that the sins of the attorney should not be visited
upon the client” but that any potential exception to this general rule would have to be decided in a
future case (internal quotation marks omitted)). Nonetheless, two important points should be noted:
First, the First Circuit has not decided a case since KPS & Associates that addresses the interaction
between attorney misconduct and Rule 60(b)(6), so its jurisprudence in this area is not as clear and
developed as that of the Seventh Circuit. See infra notes 98–101, 107–11 and accompanying text.
Second, the Seventh Circuit is more “famous” than the First Circuit for having this viewpoint. See
Zupac, supra note 22, at 1363 n.201. As such, this Article will focus on the Seventh Circuit. See
infra notes 93–111.
92. See, e.g., 7180 W. Grand Ave., 15 F.3d at 634 (citing Link, 370 U.S. at 633–34) (“The clients
are principals, the attorney is an agent, and under the law of agency the principal is bound by his
chosen agent’s deeds. So much is clear for an attorney’s wilful misconduct.”).
93. Id. at 635. However, even before this case was decided, the Seventh Circuit had many
suspicions about using Rule 60(b)(6) to grant relief for attorney misconduct. See, e.g., Nelson v.
City Colls. of Chi., 962 F.2d 754, 756 (7th Cir. 1992) (“We do not definitively address whether a
diligent client would be entitled to relief under Rule 60(b) for the gross negligence of his
counsel . . . . Nevertheless, we continue to cast serious doubt on the theory that an attorney’s gross
negligence warrants relief under Rule 60(b).”); United States v. Di Mucci, 879 F.2d 1488, 1496 (7th
Cir. 1989) (“It seems clear to us that the law in this circuit is that an attorney’s conduct must be
imputed to his client in any context.”).
94. 7108 W. Grand Ave., 15 F.3d at 633.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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use of Rule 60(b) to provide relief for the attorney’s gross misconduct.98 In
so deciding, the court, citing Link, noted that both simple negligence and
intentional acts of an attorney are imputed to a client based on agency
principles;99 therefore, attempting to use Rule 60(b) to draw a line between
simple negligence and gross negligence was unnecessary because “the
answer [would] not make any difference.”100 The result of this decision was
that the Seventh Circuit effectively precluded gross attorney negligence from
being considered as an extraordinary circumstance justifying relief under
Rule 60(b)(6).101
In Bakery Machinery & Fabrication, Inc. v. Traditional Baking, Inc.,102
the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed its holding from 7108 West Grand Avenue
and extended it past gross negligence to include situations of intentional
attorney deception.103 The case involved an attorney representing Bakery
Machinery & Fabrication, Inc. (BMF) who repeatedly told BMF for nine
months that things were “going well” in an ongoing lawsuit with Traditional
Baking, Inc. (TBI).104 In reality, things were not going well: the attorney
failed to make appearances at hearings, repeatedly neglected to respond to
court filings and motions presented to BMF by TBI, and refused to comply
with court orders in the lawsuit.105 The district court entered a default
judgment against BMF, which moved to vacate the judgment under Rule
60(b)(6) once it discovered the attorney’s deception.106
In upholding the district court’s denial of the motion to vacate,107 the
Seventh Circuit held that the ruling in 7108 West Grand Avenue that
98. Id. at 634–35.
99. Id. at 634.
100. Id. at 635. The court further expressed a policy concern that using Rule 60(b) to shield
clients from the conduct of their attorneys “would create a land office business in gross negligence.”
Id. at 634. In other words, the court feared that using Rule 60(b) in attorney-misconduct cases would
create an incentive for attorneys to act negligently. See id. (quoting Tolliver v. Northrop Corp., 786
F.2d 316, 319 (7th Cir. 1986)) (“If the lawyer’s neglect protected the client from ill consequences,
neglect would become all too common. It would be a free good—the neglect would protect the
client, and because the client could not suffer the lawyer would not suffer either.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
101. Id. at 635.
102. 570 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2009).
103. Id. at 848.
104. Id. at 847.
105. Id. at 846–47.
106. Id. at 847.
107. Id.
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mistakes of an attorney are imputed to the client goes so far as to apply to
situations in which the attorney intentionally deceived the client.108 Indeed,
the court stated that “all of the attorney’s misconduct (except in the cases
where the act is outside the scope of employment or in cases of excusable
neglect) becomes the problem of the client.”109 While the court recognized
BMF’s dire position,110 the court also viewed the fact that “BMF voluntarily
chose [the attorney]” as dispositive.111
3. The Strict Abandonment Circuits
Several circuit courts have adopted an intermediate approach that
requires a stricter standard than gross negligence but does not preclude relief
entirely like the Seventh Circuit mandates.112 Specifically, these circuits
require attorney abandonment in order to find a basis for relief under Rule
60(b)(6).113 The result is that decisions in these courts are often the same as
those in the “gross negligence” courts, but the reasoning that is used to get
to those decisions is different.114
For example, consider the Second Circuit’s decision in United States v.
Cirami, in which the United States brought an action against a couple for
collection of unpaid taxes.115 While the couple’s attorney filed a very brief
answer to the Government’s initial complaint, he failed to show up at the
hearing on the Government’s motion for summary judgment.116 The
108. Id. at 848.
109. Id. As will be seen, the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning, as evidenced by this quote in particular,
left a small but clear opening for attorney abandonment to take root as an exception to the general
rule that clients are bound by the acts of their attorneys. See infra Part VI.B.
110. Specifically, the court noted that BMF could not seek an alternative redress by directly suing
the attorney because the attorney lacked malpractice insurance. Bakery Mach., 570 F.3d at 849.
111. Id.
112. See, e.g., Heim v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 872 F.2d 245, 248–49 (8th Cir. 1989)
(holding that the gross negligence of an attorney does not satisfy Rule 60(b)(6) but “leaving his
clients unrepresented” would); Primbs v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 366, 370 (1984) (“The usual
understanding of the attorney-client agency relationship, however, should not bar relief under Rule
60(b) when the evidence is clear that the attorney and his client were not acting as one.” (emphasis
added)); United States v. Cirami, 563 F.2d 26, 34 (2d Cir. 1977).
113. See cases cited supra note 112; see also infra notes 120–25 and accompanying text.
Compare this with the “gross negligence” courts, which do not require a client to prove attorney
abandonment. See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
115. Cirami, 563 F.2d at 29.
116. Id.
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Government’s motion was thereby granted, and the couple, with the help of
new counsel, brought a Rule 60(b)(6) motion to vacate the judgment.117
Upon review, the district court determined that the previous attorney had
been suffering from a mental disorder that affected his representation of the
couple and that the couple had unsuccessfully attempted to contact him
several times about the status of the motion for summary judgment.118 Even
with these facts, the trial court refused to grant the Rule 60(b)(6) motion.119
The Second Circuit reversed the decision of the trial court and held that
Rule 60(b)(6) relief was appropriate.120 In so doing, it noted the “unique fact
of what we may term the ‘constructive disappearance’ of [the couple’s]
attorney” because his mental disorder “led him to neglect almost completely
his clients’ business.”121 The court stated that it was this constructive
disappearance that set the couple’s situation apart from the general rule
established in Link.122 The court explained that the couple’s “allegations set
up an extraordinary situation which cannot fairly or logically be classified as
mere neglect.”123 Notably, the court never mentioned “gross negligence” in
any context in explaining its decision.124 Instead, it focused on attorney
abandonment—a concept that it labeled “constructive disappearance”—as
the necessary standard that a party must prove to exempt itself from the acts
of its attorney.125
4. The Unclear Circuits
Finally, the Fifth, Tenth, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits have never
ruled on attorney misconduct and its interplay with Rule 60(b)(6), and it is
unclear what standard they would follow if they were ever to do so.126 For
117. Id.
118. Id. at 31.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 33.
121. Id. at 34.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 35 (quoting Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 613 (1940)) (internal quotation
mark omitted).
124. See id. at 33–35 (omitting any discussion of gross negligence).
125. Id. at 34.
126. See, e.g., Adams v. Thaler, 679 F.3d 312, 320 (5th Cir. 2012) (ignoring the question of
whether attorney misconduct satisfied Rule 60(b)(6) because the governing question was whether a
“change in decisional law” from the time of conviction to the time of appeal constituted an
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instance, consider the case of Solaroll Shade & Shutter Corp., Inc. v. BioEnergy Systems, Inc., in which Solaroll Shade and Shutter Corporation, Inc.
(Solaroll) brought a trademark infringement action against Bio-Energy
Systems (BES).127 The case settled, but several years later Solaroll filed a
motion to reinstate the action on the grounds that BES was not complying
with the settlement agreement.128 BES, however, never responded to this
motion or appeared at the hearing on the motion, and the court therefore
granted the motion in default.129 With the help of new counsel, BES sought
to vacate the default judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) by alleging attorney
misconduct.130 The district court denied the motion to vacate.131
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling and
held that even though some courts had vacated judgments under Rule
60(b)(6) based on gross attorney negligence, the attorney’s conduct in the
case at hand had not risen to that level.132 Therefore, the court did not decide
whether Rule 60(b)(6) could be used for attorney error because the result
would not matter.133 The court did not even indicate what standard it might
apply if Rule 60(b)(6) could be used.134
III. ACKNOWLEDGING ATTORNEY ABANDONMENT: HOW THE SUPREME
COURT LAID THE GROUNDWORK THAT WILL SOLVE THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
While the Supreme Court has not directly ruled on whether attorney
misconduct can satisfy Rule 60(b)(6), it has ruled on attorney misconduct
and its effect on clients in the criminal context.135 In two recent decisions,
extraordinary circumstance); Solaroll Shade & Shutter Corp., Inc. v. Bio-Energy Sys., Inc., 803 F.2d
1130, 1133 (11th Cir. 1986); Thunder Mountain Custom Cycles, Inc. v. Thiessen Prods., Inc., No.
06-cv-02527-PAB-BNB, 2008 WL 5412463, at *4 (D. Colo. Dec. 24, 2008) (“[T]he Tenth Circuit
has not spoken on the issue of Rule 60(b)(6) relief for gross and inexcusable neglect by a party’s
attorney . . . .”). It seems that the Federal Circuit never even addressed the concepts prior to Holland
and Maples.
127. Solaroll Shade, 803 F.2d at 1131.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1133.
133. See id.
134. See id. (omitting any discussion of what standard the court would likely apply if Rule
60(b)(6) could be used for attorney misconduct).
135. See Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912 (2012); Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010).
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Holland v. Florida and Maples v. Thomas, the Court acknowledged and
established a concept known as “attorney abandonment” for habeas corpus
petitioners.136 Essentially, this doctrine mandates that a client who was
effectively abandoned by her attorney should not be held responsible for the
attorney’s actions.137 As will be seen, the rulings in these two Supreme
Court cases effectively eliminate the circuit split over attorney misconduct
and its application to Rule 60(b)(6).138
A. Holland v. Florida
Holland v. Florida involved a man named Albert Holland who was
convicted of first-degree murder in 1997.139 After the Supreme Court denied
Holland’s petition for certiorari, Holland had exactly one year to file for
postconviction relief in either state or federal court.140 To facilitate this
process, Florida appointed counsel to represent Holland in these
postconviction proceedings.141 With only twelve days remaining in the oneyear statute of limitations, the state-appointed counsel filed a motion for
postconviction relief in state court.142 This motion remained pending in state
court for three years.143 During this time, Holland wrote his attorney letters
indicating his desire that the attorney preserve any and all claims he might
have for subsequent federal habeas corpus review and to update him on any
proceedings in his case.144 Over this three-year period, however, the attorney
responded to Holland’s requests only three times and did so only in
writing.145 Holland, frustrated with this sparse communication, twice
136. See infra Part III.A–B.
137. Holland, 560 U.S. at 659–60 (Alito, J., concurring); Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 924.
138. See infra Parts IV–VI.
139. Holland, 560 U.S. at 635.
140. Id.; see also Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. §
2244(d)(1) (2012) (“A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas
corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.”).
141. Holland, 560 U.S. at 635–36.
142. Id. at 636. This meant that if Holland’s claim for postconviction relief was unsuccessful in
state court, he would have only twelve days left to file a claim for postconviction relief in federal
court. See id. at 638. In other words, the one-year statute of limitations period does not “restart”
upon denial of relief in state court. See id.
143. Id. This included proceedings at both the Florida trial court level and at the Florida Supreme
Court. Id. at 636–38.
144. Id. at 636.
145. Id.
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petitioned the Florida Supreme Court pro se to remove the attorney from his
case and to appoint new counsel.146 In response, the Florida Supreme Court
told Holland that he “could not file any pro se papers with the court while he
was represented by counsel, including papers seeking new counsel.”147
Once the Florida Supreme Court denied Holland any postconviction
relief, his counsel had only twelve days to file a habeas corpus petition in
federal court.148 Not surprisingly, his counsel failed to file the proper
paperwork within this time period.149 Holland was unaware that a final
decision had been rendered in his case until five weeks after the statute of
limitations had expired; nevertheless, he submitted his federal habeas
petition pro se as soon as he became informed of the Florida Supreme
Court’s final decision.150 The federal district court denied this petition on the
grounds that it had not been filed within the proper statute of limitations
period.151 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial.152
The Supreme Court held that federal habeas corpus petitions could be
equitably tolled to overcome the one-year statute of limitations and that
Holland’s habeas petition may have been timely if there were extraordinary
circumstances that justified equitable tolling.153 In so deciding, the Court
146. Id. at 637.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 638; see also supra note 142 and accompanying text.
149. Holland, 560 U.S. at 638–39.
150. Id. at 639.
151. Id. at 643–44.
152. Id. at 644.
153. Id. at 649. Equitable tolling “allows a plaintiff to initiate an action beyond the statute of
limitations deadline” if doing so is necessary to accomplish justice based on the specific
circumstances of the case. 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitation of Actions § 153 (2013). Generally, a habeas
petitioner seeking equitable tolling must establish that he has been diligently pursuing his rights and
that some extraordinary circumstance made it impossible for him to enforce them. 39 AM. JUR. 2D
Habeas Corpus § 121 (2013). It should be noted that equitable tolling is not a pertinent issue to this
Article overall. See supra Part I. Nonetheless, because the Supreme Court began to mold its
concept of attorney abandonment in the framework of a case mainly concerned with equitable
tolling, it is of importance in the specific context of Holland v. Florida. See Holland, 560 U.S. at
654–60 (Alito, J., concurring) (discussing the interaction between attorney abandonment and
equitable tolling); see also infra notes 158–65 and accompanying text.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court declined to “state [its] conclusion in absolute form” because
it recognized that it is a court of review and not a court of first impression. Holland, 560 U.S. at 653
(emphasis added). Indeed, the majority wrote:
Because the District Court erroneously relied on a lack of diligence, and because the
Court of Appeals erroneously relied on an overly rigid per se approach, no lower court
has yet considered in detail the facts of this case to determine whether they indeed
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held that “professional misconduct . . . could nonetheless amount to
egregious behavior and create an extraordinary circumstance that warrants
equitable tolling”154 and that it could not “read Coleman as requiring a per se
approach in this context.”155 With this in mind, the Court observed that
Holland’s attorney failed to file a federal habeas petition despite Holland’s
letters insisting that he do so, failed to research the proper filing date of the
petition, failed to inform Holland about the ongoing proceedings in his case,
and failed to communicate with Holland.156 Viewing these facts as a whole,
the Court held that the conduct of Holland’s attorney might have been an
extraordinary circumstance that properly excused Holland from meeting the
one-year statute of limitations.157
More important, however, was Justice Alito’s concurring opinion.158
Noting that the majority had not established a criterion for determining what
constitutes extraordinary circumstances,159 Justice Alito began to outline a
rough standard of attorney abandonment that the Supreme Court eventually
adopted in Maples v. Thomas.160 In so doing, Justice Alito noted that
attorney negligence, whether ordinary or gross, “is not an extraordinary
circumstance warranting equitable tolling.”161 Instead, he distinguished
constitute extraordinary circumstances sufficient to warrant equitable relief . . . . Thus,
because we conclude that the District Court’s determination must be set aside, we leave it
to the Court of Appeals to determine whether the facts in this record entitle Holland to
equitable tolling, or whether further proceedings, including an evidentiary hearing, might
indicate that respondent should prevail.
Id. at 653–54. Put differently, while the Supreme Court definitively held that AEDPA’s one-year
statute of limitations, see supra note 140, is subject to equitable tolling, it declined to state whether
the particular facts of the case satisfied the elements of equitable tolling. See 39 AM. JUR. 2D, supra
at § 121 (describing how a habeas petitioner establishes equitable tolling).
154. Holland, 560 U.S. at 651.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 652.
157. Id. at 652–54.
158. See infra Part III.B for a discussion of the majority opinion in Maples, which adopts Justice
Alito’s reasoning from his concurring opinion in Holland.
159. Holland, 560 U.S. at 654 (Alito, J. concurring); see also supra note 154 and accompanying
text.
160. Holland, 560 U.S. at 559–60 (Alito, J., concurring); see also infra Part III.B.
161. Holland, 560 U.S. at 655 (Alito, J. concurring). Justice Alito noted that making a boundary
distinguishing between ordinary and gross negligence would establish “a basis for arguing that
tolling is appropriate in almost every counseled case involving a missed deadline.” Id. at 658. He
predicted that this would not only burden the federal district courts but would also make the
availability of tolling reliant upon “the highly artificial distinction between gross and ordinary
negligence.” Id.
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gross negligence from attorney abandonment and found that the difference
was paramount.162 He reasoned that while “attorney negligence, however
styled, does not provide a basis for equitable tolling . . . attorney misconduct
that is not constructively attributable to the petitioner” is an extraordinary
circumstance that justifies equitable tolling.163 “Common sense,” he argued,
“dictates that a litigant cannot be held constructively responsible for the
conduct of an attorney who is not operating as his agent in any meaningful
sense of that word.”164 Finding that Holland’s attorney abandoned him,
Justice Alito agreed with the majority’s conclusion that Holland’s one-year
habeas corpus deadline could be equitably tolled.165
B. Maples v. Thomas
The Supreme Court returned to a similar issue in Maples v. Thomas,166
wherein the Court explicitly adopted Justice Alito’s concurrence from
Holland outlining attorney abandonment as the new governing standard.167
Cory R. Maples was a death-row inmate in Alabama who was represented in
his postconviction proceedings by two attorneys who worked at the same
law firm and were serving pro bono.168 During the pendency of these
proceedings in Alabama state court, both of the attorneys left their firm,
thereby ending their representation of Maples.169 Neither attorney told
Maples or the Alabama trial court that they would no longer be representing
him, nor did they appoint substitute counsel to take over his
representation.170 Consequently, when the Alabama trial court denied
Maples’ petition for postconviction relief and mailed copies of the order to
the law firm, the orders were returned to the clerk of the Alabama court
unopened.171 This resulted in Maples missing the deadline to appeal the
162. Id. at 658–59.
163. Id. at 659 (emphasis added).
164. Id.
165. Id. Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas dissented to the majority ruling on the grounds that a
close reading of AEDPA precludes any concept of equitable tolling and that Holland would not
qualify for it even if it were not precluded. Id. at 660–73 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
166. 132 S. Ct. 912 (2012).
167. See infra notes 175–80 and accompanying text.
168. Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 918.
169. Id. at 919.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 919–20.
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Alabama trial court’s ruling through no fault of his own.172 Thereafter,
Maples petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court.173 Both the
district court and the Eleventh Circuit denied his petition on the grounds that
Maples’ failure to appeal the trial court’s order meant that he had not
exhausted his procedural remedies in Alabama state court.174
The Supreme Court reversed both the district court’s and Eleventh
Circuit’s rulings and held that Maples should not be bound by his procedural
default in the Alabama state court.175 The Court, citing Justice Alito’s
concurrence in Holland, reasoned that “under agency principles, a client
cannot be charged with the acts or omissions of an attorney who has
abandoned him”176 and that an attorney who has abandoned his client has
“severed the principal-agent relationship.”177 The Court, though, was still
careful to note that the general rule established in Coleman that clients were
bound by the acts of their attorneys still governed.178 Thus, the Court, once
again citing Justice Alito’s concurrence in Holland, recognized that there is
an “essential difference between a claim of attorney error, however
egregious, and a claim that an attorney had essentially abandoned his
client.”179 Applying this newly-formed standard to Maples’ situation, the
Court concluded that Maples was effectively abandoned by the two
attorneys because they did not tell Maples they would no longer be
representing him, they did not seek permission to withdraw from
representation, and they did not appoint substitute counsel to take their place
as representatives of Maples.180
IV. ATTORNEY ABANDONMENT IN THE CIVIL CONTEXT
The combined Holland and Maples decisions, therefore, definitively
established an exception for attorney abandonment in the factual contexts of

172. Id. at 920.
173. Id. at 921.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 927–28.
176. Id. at 924.
177. Id. at 922–23.
178. Id. at 922.
179. Id. at 923. This is referring to the difference between gross attorney negligence and attorney
abandonment. See id.
180. Id. at 924–26.
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postconviction proceedings for two criminal defendants.181 At first glance,
this may seem like the Court only meant for attorney abandonment to apply
in the criminal context.182 This is incorrect: The Supreme Court likely
intended and expected the attorney abandonment doctrine to spread to the
civil realm.183 This is true for two principal reasons.184
First, and most apparently, the Court never specifically limited its
holdings to the criminal context.185 In fact, the Court did not reference
“defendants” or “criminals” being abandoned by their attorneys, but instead
repeatedly referrenced “clients,” “petitioners,” and “litigants.”186 None of
these terms are confined to parties in criminal proceedings.187 One would
think that if the Court had wanted to limit the concept of attorney
abandonment to criminal defendants, it would have been much more explicit
in doing so.188

181. See supra notes 139–80 and accompanying text.
182. Put differently, some people might initially think the Court intended this to be a very narrow
holding.
183. See infra notes 185–98. While the Supreme Court probably meant for attorney abandonment
to be available in civil cases, it did not necessarily mean for Rule 60(b)(6) to be universally available
as a remedy for attorney abandonment. This is a distinct difference: civil cases could plausibly
implicate attorney abandonment without implicating Rule 60(b)(6). However, the consequence of
the availability of attorney abandonment in the civil arena is that Rule 60(b)(6) is always available as
a remedy. This argument is taken up in more detail in Parts V–VI.
184. See infra notes 185–98.
185. See Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 922–24; Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 647–53 (2010); Holland,
560 U.S. at 654–60 (Alito, J., concurring).
186. See, e.g., Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 922–23 (“A markedly different situation is presented,
however, when an attorney abandons his client without notice . . . . Having severed the principalagent relationship, an attorney no longer acts, or fails to act, as the client’s representative.”
(emphasis added)); id. at 923 (“In a concurring opinion in Holland, Justice Alito homed in on . . .
[when] an attorney had essentially abandoned his client.” (emphasis added)); id. at 924 (“[U]nder
agency principles, a client cannot be charged with the acts or omissions of an attorney who has
abandoned him.” (emphasis added)); Holland, 560 U.S. at 650 (“[A] petitioner ‘must “bear the risk
of attorney error.”’” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)); id. at 659 (Alito, J., concurring)
(“Common sense dictates that a litigant cannot be held constructively responsible for the conduct of
an attorney who is not operating as his agent in any meaningful sense of that word.” (emphasis
added)).
187. A client is “[a] person or entity that employs a professional for advice or help in that
professional’s line of work.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 289 (9th ed. 2009). A petitioner is “[a]
party who presents a petition to a court or other official body, esp. when seeking relief on appeal.”
Id. at 1262. A litigant is “[a] party to a lawsuit.” Id. at 1017. Notably, none of these terms are
limited to criminal contexts. See id. at 289, 1017, 1262.
188. This is especially true given the Court’s language in Maples that there should not be a
distinction between equitable tolling contexts and procedural default contexts when considering the
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Second, and most importantly, even though Holland and Maples were
rooted in the criminal procedure context, the proceedings in which these
cases arose were governed by the same standard that governs attorney
misconduct in civil cases: the relationship-based model.189
The
performance-based model only controls in cases where a defendant is
guaranteed the right to counsel.190 Because a defendant is not guaranteed the
right to counsel in federal habeas corpus proceedings or in state collateral
attack proceedings191—the proceedings at issue in Holland and Maples192—
claims alleging attorney misconduct in these contexts are tested using the
relationship-based model.193 This same model controls in civil cases because
parties to civil proceedings are also not guaranteed counsel.194 Therefore,
because the Supreme Court explicitly outlined attorney abandonment in a
proceeding governed by the relationship-based model, it would seem
obvious that the Court expected attorney abandonment to be available in all
proceedings governed by the relationship-based model,195 including
proceedings implicating Rule 60(b)(6).196 Put differently, the important
distinction is between situations where there is and is not a right to counsel,
not between criminal and civil proceedings.197 Again, if the Court had
wanted the distinction to be between criminal and civil cases, it would have
likely said so.198
Consequently, the Supreme Court likely intended to establish attorney
abandonment as a concept that must be recognized in both civil and criminal
contexts that implicate the relationship-based model.199 If so, every circuit
difference between gross negligence and attorney abandonment. Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 923 n.7. In
other words, because the Supreme Court analogized equitable tolling cases to cases of procedural
default, and because Rule 60(b)(6) is a remedy that can cure procedural defaults, it is quite
reasonable to assume that elements applicable to equitable tolling cases are equally applicable to
Rule 60(b)(6) cases. See id.
189. See infra text accompanying notes 190–94.
190. See supra Part II.A.1.
191. See supra note 34.
192. See supra notes 139–52, 168–74 and accompanying text.
193. See supra Part II.A.2.
194. See supra Part II.A.2.
195. See supra note 188. See generally Zupac, supra note 22 (outlining the relationship-based
model and when it applies).
196. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
197. See Zupac, supra note 22, at 1332.
198. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 185–98 and accompanying text; see also Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912,
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court must now recognize attorney abandonment in the civil arena in some
way or another because Supreme Court precedent constitutes mandatory
authority that the courts of appeals must follow.200
V. SOLVING THE SPLIT: THE INTERACTION BETWEEN RULE 60(b)(6) AND
ATTORNEY ABANDONMENT IN LIGHT OF HOLLAND AND MAPLES
The interesting consequence of mandating that circuit courts recognize
attorney abandonment in civil cases will be how attorney abandonment will
eventually come up in such contexts. While the Supreme Court ruled on
what attorney abandonment is and that lower courts must acknowledge it, it
did not mandate how the circuit courts must apply it.201 With just a few
logical steps, however, this Article will show that there is one consequence
that must necessarily exist because of attorney abandonment even though the

924 (2012).
200. Of course, one could make the argument that there are other distinct differences between
civil and criminal proceedings that would make the Holland and Maples attorney abandonment
standard inapplicable in the civil context. For instance, litigants in civil cases generally stand to lose
money if they do not prevail, whereas defendants in criminal cases lose their liberty and ability to
live freely if they do not prevail. The latter is clearly a more worrisome result, so one could argue
that the Supreme Court only had criminal contexts in mind when deciding Holland and Maples
because the Court would realize it is more important to have a remedy for attorney abandonment in a
criminal context than in a civil context. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court’s consistent use of the
relationship-based model in postconviction relief proceedings—the same model it uses in the civil
realm—prior to Holland and Maples weighs heavily against such an interpretation. See supra notes
189–98 and accompanying text.
One could likewise argue that, even if the Supreme Court did intend to have attorney
abandonment apply in civil contexts, this is not mandatory authority that lower courts must follow
because the Court never explicitly stated such a rule in either of its opinions. A “mandatory rule,”
however, is “[a] legal rule that is not subject to a contrary agreement,” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
1446 (9th ed. 2009), and the embedded term “rule” is “an established and authoritative standard or
principle; a general norm mandating or guiding conduct or action in a given type of situation.” Id.
(emphasis added). Here, the Supreme Court’s likely intention of having attorney abandonment
apply in civil cases, although not explicitly stated, can be considered a “principle” or “guiding
conduct” that can be distilled as a logical conclusion from what the court did explicitly state. In
other words—and in accordance with the definition of “mandatory rule”—necessary conclusions that
derive from stated rules have the same power and authority as the stated rules themselves.
Therefore, as long as lower courts can correctly reach this same conclusion about the Supreme
Court’s intent regarding attorney abandonment—if they do not, these courts may very well be
applying incorrect law—this intent is necessarily mandatory authority.
201. See Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 922–24 (outlining attorney abandonment but omitting any
discussion of how lower courts must apply it).
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Supreme Court did not address that consequence.202 Namely, if a civil court
determines that a party was abandoned by his attorney, that court must have
the power to vacate the judgment under Rule 60(b)(6).203
To start, consider the Supreme Court’s statement in Maples that “a
client cannot be charged with the acts or omissions of an attorney who has
abandoned him,”204 which is a strict and explicit mandate.205 In essence, the
Court is saying that when attorney abandonment exists, there must be some
type of remedy for the client that immunizes him from any judgment against
him.206 If this were not the case, and it was not a requirement that there must
be some type of remedy for the client, the result would be inconsistent with
what the Maples Court held because it would not make sense for a court to
be unable to provide complete relief for an abandoned party if it is true that
an abandoned party “cannot be charged” with the acts of his attorney.207
Although a court must necessarily provide complete relief to an
abandoned client, the client must conform with, and is constrained by, the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when seeking such relief.208 Notably, the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure list three ways that a client could
potentially obtain complete relief from the conduct of her attorney: Rule
55(c),209 Rule 59,210 and Rule 60(b)(6).211
Rule 60(b) gives a court the power to vacate judgments, orders, or
proceedings.212 Rule 55(c), on the other hand, states that a “court may set
aside an entry of default for good cause, and it may set aside a default
judgment under Rule 60(b).”213 As illustrated by some of the cases in Part
II.C above,214 many cases of attorney abandonment involve default
judgments, so, at first glance, Rule 55(c) would seem to be an ideal
202. See infra notes 204–32 and accompanying text.
203. See infra notes 204–32 and accompanying text.
204. 132 S. Ct. at 924 (emphasis added).
205. See id.
206. See id.
207. See id.
208. FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (“These rules govern the procedure in all civil actions and proceedings in
the United States district courts . . . .”); see also supra text accompanying notes 204–07.
209. FED. R. CIV. P. 55(c).
210. FED. R. CIV. P. 59.
211. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(6).
212. Id.; see also supra Part II.B.
213. FED. R. CIV. P. 55(c).
214. See supra Part II.C.
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mechanism for relief in such situations.215
But two main problems with Rule 55(c) exist that make it insufficient as
a remedy for attorney abandonment.216 First, an entry of default is different
than a default judgment,217 and Rule 55(c) makes a distinction between the
two.218 As such, “good cause” is not enough for a court to set aside a default
judgment; instead, it must use Rule 60(b).219 Second, even if the argument
could be made that a default judgment could be set aside for good cause,
there has been no indication by the Supreme Court that situations of attorney
abandonment must involve default judgments.220 Granted, many cases of
attorney abandonment involve default judgments,221 but this is not an explicit
requirement.222 These two problems show that Rule 55(c) cannot be used in
every situation,223 which goes against the unyielding Maples mandate that
clients “cannot be charged” with the conduct of attorneys that abandoned
them.224 On the other hand, satisfying the requirements of Rule 60(b) is
more difficult than satisfying the requirements of “good cause,” so Rule
60(b)(6) could be used to set aside both default judgments and entries of
default.225 For this reason, Rule 60(b) is not solely limited to certain
215. See supra Part II.C.
216. See infra notes 217–26 and accompanying text.
217. See William H. Danne, Jr., Annotation, What Constitutes “Good Cause” Allowing Federal
Court to Relieve Party of His Default Under Rule 55(c) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 29
A.L.R. FED. 7 § 2[a] (1976) (“[T]he majority of courts have recognized that Rule 55(c) ‘good cause’
is a standard exclusively governing requests for relief from default entries, the grounds enumerated
in Rule 60(b) becoming applicable when the default has ripened into a default judgment which is
sought to be set aside.” (emphasis added)).
218. FED. R. CIV. P. 55(c).
219. See id.
220. See Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 922–24 (2012) (omitting any discussion of a
procedural default requirement).
221. See, e.g., cases cited supra Part II.C.
222. See Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 922–24.
223. Specifically, it could not be used in situations of attorney abandonment where there was no
default judgment. This could occur, for example, if an attorney did not communicate with a client or
respond to court documents for months at a time but still showed up at a hearing on a motion to
dismiss and lost. This would not be a default judgment because the attorney showed up at the
hearing; however, a good argument could still be made that the attorney had abandoned the client by
his previous lack of diligence and communication.
224. 132 S. Ct. at 924.
225. In other words, if a party were to satisfy the requirements of Rule 60(b), that party would
necessarily satisfy the requirements of “good cause.” See Danne, supra note 217, § 2[a] (“[C]ourts
have generally acknowledged that ‘good cause’ is a broader and more liberal standard than anything
found in Rule 60(b), and that, consequently, something less may be required to warrant the opening
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situations in the way that Rule 55(c) is.226
Additionally, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 gives a court the
power to “grant a new trial on all or some of the issues” that are in dispute.227
In theory, this could completely relieve an abandoned client from the
conduct of his attorney: the client could get a new lawyer; obtain a new,
different verdict; and not be bound by the unfair initial verdict.228 Rule 59,
however, is plagued by the same problem that plagues Rule 55(c): there is
no requirement that attorney abandonment can only be alleged at trial.229 For
this reason, Rule 60(b) is the only Federal Rule of Civil Procedure that can
guarantee in all situations that a client will not be bound by the acts of his
attorney.230
Therefore, if a civil court finds that an attorney has abandoned his client,
of an entry of default than would be necessary to set aside a default judgment.”).
226. See id. One could also make the argument that courts could use Rule 55(c) for instances of
default and use Rule 60(b)(6) when a default is not at issue. If so, the Maples requirement that a
client “cannot be charged” with the acts of his attorney would still be satisfied, albeit through two
separate, combined mechanisms. Such an approach, however, is inappropriate: This Article is
alleging that judgments must be vacated if there is attorney abandonment, and Rule 55(c) explicitly
makes a distinction between defaults and default judgments. As stated above, one can only use the
“good cause” standard of Rule 55(c) if a default is at issue, not a default judgment. See supra text
accompanying notes 217–19. As such, even if a court wanted to utilize Rule 55(c) in cases of
default judgments, the text of Rule 55(c) would direct the court to utilize Rule 60(b) instead and not
to use the “good cause” standard. Therefore, Rule 60(b)(6) remains the sole tool that can be used to
vacate judgments tainted by attorney abandonment.
227. FED. R. CIV. P. 59.
228. See id.
229. See Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 922–24 (2012) (omitting any discussion of a
procedural default requirement or the necessity of a trial).
230. See supra notes 202–09 and accompanying text. An additional reason—although outside the
scope of this Article—that Rule 59 cannot always be used is because of its time requirement. Rule
59 allows for a new trial only if a motion is filed 28 days after the entry of the judgment. FED. R.
CIV. P. 59. As shown above in note 64, though, Rule 60(b)(6) and the extraordinary circumstances
test are invoked only after a year has passed since a judgment has been entered. Furthermore, as
seen by the vast majority of the cases discussed in this Article, allegations of attorney abandonment
are usually brought a year after judgment. Thus, by the time clients realize that they are entitled to
relief from judgment on the grounds of attorney abandonment—usually later than a year after
judgment—the time to bring a Rule 59 motion will almost always have long since passed and Rule
60(b)(6) will be the only avenue for relief. In the event that a client alleges attorney abandonment
after 28 days but within a year of judgment being entered, other provisions of Rule 60(b)—
specifically, Rule 60(b)(1)—can be used to vacate the judgment instead of Rule 60(b)(6). In the
unlikely scenario that an allegation of attorney abandonment is brought within 28 days after a
judgment is entered, either Rule 60(b)(1) or Rule 59 could apply. However, as also stated in note 64,
time requirements are not within the scope of this Article, so it will be assumed that Rule 60(b)(6)
will apply regardless of whether a litigant brings a claim within a year.
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that court must necessarily have the power to use Rule 60(b)(6) to vacate
any judgment that has been rendered against that client.231 Because a client
“cannot be charged with the acts or omissions of an attorney who has
abandoned him,” this is the only remedy that can guarantee a client complete
relief from judgment in any situation—whether a default judgment, a trial, or
something else entirely.232
VI. CHANGES IN JURISPRUDENCE THAT THE CIRCUITS MUST MAKE
As this Article has shown thus far, the Supreme Court’s recent decisions
in Holland and Maples necessarily give each and every federal court the
power to grant relief to abandoned clients in civil cases through Rule
60(b)(6).233 As shown above, however,234 not all of the circuit courts had
adopted such a view prior to these two decisions.235 Therefore, of the four
different approaches that the circuit courts use, three require a shift in
jurisprudence regarding Rule 60(b)(6) and its interaction with attorney
misconduct.236
A. The Gross Negligence Circuits
The circuit courts that have adopted the view that an attorney’s gross
negligence can satisfy Rule 60(b)(6) must slightly change their
jurisprudence.237 Specifically, these courts must acknowledge that attorney
abandonment can satisfy Rule 60(b)(6)—as they already do—but they must
also acknowledge that gross negligence cannot satisfy it.238 This change
comes from the Supreme Court’s holding in Maples that there is an

231. See supra notes 212–30 and accompanying text.
232. Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 924; see also supra notes 212–30 and accompanying text. To be sure, a
court may choose to employ Rule 55(c) and Rule 59 as remedies in cases involving default
judgments or trials. However, in other proceedings—a motion for summary judgment, for
instance—where the attorney has abandoned his client, neither 55(c) or Rule 59 could be utilized.
Thus, a court must necessarily have Rule 60(b)(6) as a tool to vacate judgments because it is the only
remedy available in situations where there has not been a default judgment or a trial.
233. See supra Parts IV–V.
234. See supra Part II.C.
235. See supra Parts II.C.2, II.C.4.
236. See infra Part VI.A–D.
237. See infra notes 238–41 and accompanying text.
238. See infra notes 239–40 and accompanying text.
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“essential difference between a claim of attorney error, however egregious,
and a claim that an attorney had essentially abandoned his client.”239 In
other words, the Court made a distinction between gross negligence and
attorney abandonment, the necessary implication being that the latter
satisfies Rule 60(b)(6) but that the former does not.240 As such, the “gross
negligence” circuits must follow suit.
Practically, this will have very little impact on the outcome of most
cases in these circuits because what these courts consider gross negligence
can often be labeled as attorney abandonment.241 Their case law, though,
still must change in order to preclude a situation where an attorney was
grossly negligent but could not reasonably be considered to have abandoned
the client.242 For instance, reconsider the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Tani.243
In that case, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the attorney at issue was grossly
negligent and that his former client therefore deserved relief under Rule
60(b)(6) because the attorney was almost completely non-responsive to the
Importantly, the court noted that this non-responsiveness
client.244
constituted conduct so grossly negligent that the attorney had “virtually
abandoned” his client.245 After the Supreme Court’s decision in Holland and
Maples, the Ninth Circuit would now have to say that the Tani attorney’s
abandonment qualified his former client for relief under Rule 60(b)(6),246 but
it could not say that the attorney’s gross negligence was a basis for relief.247
This may seem like a nuanced distinction, but it is quite significant. Had the
attorney, for example, remained in constant contact with his client but filed
court documents that were egregiously lacking in substance and preparation,
an argument could be reasonably made that this qualified as being grossly
negligent but not as attorney abandonment. If this were the case, Rule
60(b)(6) could not be used to remedy such conduct after the Supreme

239. Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 923 (2012) (quoting Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631,
656–59 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring)).
240. See supra Parts III, V.
241. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
242. See infra notes 243–48 and accompanying text.
243. Cmty. Dental Servs. v. Tani, 282 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 2002); see also supra Part II.C.1.
244. Tani, 282 F.3d at 1167, 1170.
245. Id. at 1170.
246. See supra Part V.
247. See Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 923 (2012) (noting the difference between gross
negligence and attorney abandonment).
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Court’s decisions in Holland and Maples.248
While this change in jurisprudence as required by Holland and Maples
has at least been recognized in several recent decisions by the Ninth
Circuit,249 the Ninth Circuit does not yet seem to appreciate the significance
of this change.250 For example, in Mackey v. Hoffman,251 the Ninth Circuit
noted that the Supreme Court in Maples held that there was a difference
between negligence and attorney abandonment.252 However, the Mackey
court went on to say that “when a federal habeas petitioner has been
inexcusably and grossly neglected by his counsel in a manner amounting to
attorney abandonment in every meaningful sense that has jeopardized the
petitioner’s appellate rights, a district court may grant relief pursuant to Rule
60(b)(6).”253 This is somewhat misleading: the Ninth Circuit is still trying to
equate gross negligence with attorney abandonment, while Holland and
Maples made it clear that there is a distinct separation between the two.254
The “gross negligence” circuits still need to distinguish more completely the
difference between gross negligence and attorney abandonment.255
B. The No Relief Circuits
Out of all the different circuit approaches, the approach taken by the

248. See id.
249. Stokley v. Ryan, 705 F.3d 401, 406 (9th Cir. 2012) (Paez, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Supreme
Court [in Maples] relied on Justice Alito’s concurrence in Holland v. Florida . . . to distinguish
attorney negligence from abandonment.”); Mackey v. Hoffman, 682 F.3d 1247, 1252–53 (9th Cir.
2012); Towery v. Ryan, 673 F.3d 933, 941 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting the distinction in Maples between
negligence and attorney abandonment).
250. See infra text accompanying notes 252–54.
251. 682 F.3d 1247 (9th Cir. 2012).
252. Id. at 1252–53 (“The [Supreme] Court noted that, although an attorney is normally the
prisoner’s agent, and the principal typically bears the risk of negligent conduct on the part of his
agent under well-settled principles of agency law, ‘[a] markedly different situation is presented,
however, when an attorney abandons his client without notice, and thereby occasions the default.’”).
253. Id. at 1253 (emphasis added). It is interesting to note that the court in this case actually
applied Rule 60(b)(6) in the context of a habeas corpus petitioner. Id. The Ninth Circuit was able to
do this because the Supreme Court decided in Gonzalez v. Crosby that Rule 60(b)(6) can apply to
habeas corpus proceedings. 545 U.S. 524, 534 (2005) (“Rule 60(b) has an unquestionably valid role
to play in habeas cases.”).
254. Compare Mackey, 682 F.3d at 1252–53, with Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 923 (2012),
and Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 656–59 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring).
255. See Mackey, 682 F.3d at 1253 (discussing agency and client abandonment).
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Seventh Circuit is in the most obvious need of change.256 Specifically, the
Seventh Circuit needs to overturn its prior holdings that attorney misconduct
cannot satisfy Rule 60(b)(6).257 The interesting part is that it does not need
to explicitly overrule any case in order to do so.258
The reasoning for this is in the language the Seventh Circuit used in
Bakery Machinery & Fabrication, Inc. v. Traditional Baking, Inc.259 The
Seventh Circuit held in Bakery Machinery that “all of the attorney’s
misconduct (except in the cases where the act is outside the scope of
employment or in cases of excusable neglect) becomes the problem of the
client.”260 Thus, the Seventh Circuit ruled that attorney misconduct could
never satisfy Rule 60(b)(6) unless an attorney was acting outside of his
scope of authority for one reason or another.261 The Seventh Circuit,
however, never once considered when or what actions would cause the
attorney to “act . . . outside the scope of his employment.”262 To illustrate, it
is as if the Seventh Circuit created a hole that, if filled, would allow a client
to seek relief under Rule 60(b)(6) for the acts of his attorney that were
outside the scope of the attorney’s employment.263 The problem was that
prior to Holland and Maples, the Seventh Circuit never had any instrument
to fill this hole;264 indeed, it never even considered the possibility that
attorney misconduct itself could sever the attorney-client employment

256. See supra Part II.C.2.
257. See supra Part II.C.2.
258. See infra notes 259–69 and accompanying text.
259. 570 F.3d 845, 848 (7th Cir. 2009).
260. Id. (emphasis added).
261. See id.
262. See id. (omitting any discussion of what brings an attorney outside the scope of his
employment).
263. See id.
264. The Seventh Circuit has actually identified a form of attorney abandonment, but it has only
done so in situations where a defendant is guaranteed a right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment.
See Kusay v. United States, 62 F.3d 192, 196 (7th Cir. 1995) (“A lawyer who deserts his client does
not foist the burdens of self-representation on the defendant; instead the lawyer brings shame (and
professional discipline) on himself, and the defendant is entitled to a new proceeding with the aid of
a competent, ethical lawyer.” (emphasis added)). As such, this form of attorney abandonment could
never be used—and has never been used—as an instrument to fill the hole from Bakery Machinery;
it was only brought up in the context of the performance-based model, so it cannot be utilized in
contexts governed by the relationship-based model (such as civil cases). See also Part II.A
(describing the performance-based and relationship-based models, when they are used, and the
crossover between them).
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relationship.265
The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Holland and Maples changes all of
this.266 In these cases, the Court held that attorney abandonment severs the
principal-agent relationship—that is, the attorney-client relationship.267
Therefore, the hole established in Bakery Machinery now has an instrument
to fill it: attorney abandonment.268 The result is that the Seventh Circuit does
not actually need to change any of its case law in order to allow attorney
abandonment to qualify for relief under Rule 60(b)(6) because Bakery
Machinery and the Holland and Maples decisions fit together like two pieces
of a puzzle.269
One recent Seventh Circuit decision actually alluded to the attorney
abandonment standard outlined in Maples, but it did not answer whether it
would satisfy Rule 60(b)(6).270 In Nash v. Hepp, the Seventh Circuit noted
that “[i]n Maples counsel abandoned the petitioner without warning.”271 The
Seventh Circuit, however, refused to decide whether abandonment applied
because Maples had been decided after the district court’s decision in
Nash.272 Indeed, the Seventh Circuit stated that “a change in law showing
that a previous judgment may have been incorrect is not an ‘extraordinary
circumstance’ justifying relief under Rule 60(b)(6).”273 Even with this
indecision, it is likely that the Seventh Circuit’s acknowledgement of the
Maples standard shows a potential shift in its jurisprudence toward a
recognition that Rule 60(b)(6) must be available as a tool to remedy attorney
abandonment.274

265. Bakery Mach., 570 F.3d at 848.
266. See infra notes 267–69 and accompanying text.
267. Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 923 (2012); Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 658–59
(2010) (Alito, J., concurring).
268. Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 923; Holland, 560 U.S. at 659 (Alito, J., concurring).
269. Upon reflection, one wonders why the Seventh Circuit would leave such a blatant opening in
its case law if, as has been proven, this opening had the potential to destroy the circuit’s intention to
always bind clients with the conduct of their attorneys. See Bakery Mach., 570 F.3d at 848.
270. See Nash v. Hepp, 740 F.3d 1075, 1079 (7th Cir. 2014).
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. See id.; see also supra Part V (explaining why Rule 60(b)(6) is the universal remedy for
attorney abandonment in civil cases).
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C. The Strict Abandonment Circuits
The “strict abandonment” circuits constitute the one approach to the
interaction between attorney misconduct and Rule 60(b)(6) that does not
need to change.275 These circuits hold that only attorney abandonment—not
gross negligence—can provide a basis for relief under Rule 60(b)(6),276 a
philosophy which is in exact accordance with Holland and Maples.277
Therefore, Holland and Maples have no real impact on these courts other
than to reaffirm the fact that gross negligence cannot provide a basis for
relief.278
D. The Unclear Circuits
Notably, up until Holland and Maples, the Fifth, Tenth, Eleventh, and
Federal Circuits had never determined what would happen if a client tried to
obtain relief from judgment by alleging attorney misconduct under Rule
60(b)(6).279 After these two Supreme Court decisions, however, these
circuits are forced to recognize that attorney abandonment qualifies a party
for relief under Rule 60(b)(6).280 To illustrate, consider the case Solaroll
Shade & Shutter Corp., Inc. v. Bio-Energy Systems, Inc.,281 where the
Eleventh Circuit held that it was not going to decide if an attorney’s gross
negligence satisfied Rule 60(b)(6) because the attorney’s conduct in the case
did not rise to that level and, therefore, the result would not matter.282 If this
same case had been decided after Holland and Maples, the Eleventh Circuit
would necessarily have had to hold that attorney abandonment—but not
gross negligence—could warrant relief under Rule 60(b)(6) regardless of
275. See infra notes 276–78 and accompanying text.
276. See supra Part II.C.3.
277. See Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 923 (2012) (“In a concurring opinion in Holland,
Justice [Alito] homed in on the essential difference between a claim of attorney error, however
egregious, and a claim that an attorney had essentially abandoned his client.” (citing Holland v.
Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 657–58 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring)).
278. There have been no decisions thus far from either the Second Circuit, Eighth Circuit, or
Court of Federal Claims in light of Holland and Maples reaffirming the holdings that only attorney
abandonment can satisfy Rule 60(b)(6). Nonetheless, as previously discussed, this is the only
possible interpretation these courts could make. See supra Part V.
279. See supra Part II.C.4.
280. See supra Part V.
281. 803 F.2d 1130 (11th Cir. 1986); see also supra Part II.C.4.
282. Solaroll Shade, 803 F.2d at 1133.
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whether that result was of consequence to the facts at hand.283
Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit has actually started to change its
jurisprudence to reflect these new requirements set by Holland and
Maples.284 In Cadet v. Florida Department of Corrections, the Eleventh
Circuit held that “[i]n light of the Supreme Court’s Maples decision, we hold
that attorney negligence, however gross or egregious, does not qualify as an
‘extraordinary circumstance’ for purposes of equitable tolling; abandonment
of the attorney-client relationship . . . is required.”285 Granted, this holding
did not reference Rule 60(b)(6).286 Nonetheless, the fact that the Eleventh
Circuit held that only attorney abandonment is an extraordinary
circumstance for purposes of equitable tolling lends credence to the idea that
it would also consider only attorney abandonment to be an extraordinary
circumstance for purposes of Rule 60(b)(6).287
Regardless of the
significance of this decision, though, all of the “unclear circuits” will
eventually have to fully extend the holdings of Holland and Maples to
283. See supra Part V.
284. See Cadet v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 742 F.3d 473, 481 (11th Cir. 2014).
285. Id. In another case, the Eleventh Circuit considered a situation where a prisoner challenged
the district court’s denial of his Rule 60(b)(6) motion. Ryder v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 521 F. App’x
817, 818 (11th Cir. 2013). However, the Eleventh Circuit never got to the merits of the Rule
60(b)(6) claim and whether attorney misconduct could satisfy it because it determined that the
prisoner did not file the Rule 60(b)(6) motion within the proper statute of limitations. Id. at 820.
Although the court discussed Maples, attorney abandonment, and Rule 60(b)(6), it did so without
considering how they interact with each other; the case, therefore, is not overly helpful in parsing out
the Eleventh Circuit’s jurisprudence post-Maples. See id.
286. See Cadet, 742 F.3d at 481 (omitting any discussion of Rule 60(b)(6)).
287. See Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 923 n.7 (2012) (“Holland v. Florida involved tolling
of a federal time bar, while Coleman v. Thompson concerned cause for excusing a procedural default
in state court. We see no reason, however, why the distinction between attorney negligence and
attorney abandonment should not hold in both contexts.” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)); see
also supra Part IV (discussing how the attorney-abandonment standard from Holland and Maples—a
concept that was first formulated by Justice Alito in the equitable tolling context—applies in
situations where Rule 60(b)(6) governs); supra note 153 (discussing the definition and significance
of equitable tolling).
The Federal Circuit, Fifth Circuit, and Tenth Circuit have reached holdings similar to the
Eleventh Circuit. Sneed v. Shinseki, 737 F.3d 719, 728 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“The Supreme Court held
in Maples and Holland that habeas petitioners may benefit from equitable tolling in cases of attorney
abandonment, and this court concludes that the same protection extends to veterans.”); Manning v.
Epps, 688 F.3d 177, 184 n.2 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that “attorney abandonment can qualify as an
extraordinary circumstance for equitable tolling purposes”); Ulrey v. Zavaras, 483 F. App’x 536,
541 (10th Cir. 2012) (citing Maples in holding that equitable tolling applies “when a habeas
petitioner’s failure to file timely objections is occasioned by counsel’s unnoticed abandonment of the
case”).
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situations where Rule 60(b)(6) governs.288
VII. SOME POTENTIAL DIFFICULTIES BROUGHT ABOUT BY HOLLAND AND
MAPLES
As noted above in Part V, the Supreme Court’s decisions in Holland and
Maples effectively require that Rule 60(b)(6) must always be available as a
tool to cure attorney abandonment in civil cases.289 This result creates two
important consequences that need to be addressed.290
First, the holdings from Holland and Maples form an inherent tension
with the language of Rule 60(b)(6).291 Rule 60(b)(6) says a “court may
relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding” for “any
other reason that justifies relief,”292 but, as shown above, the consequence of
Holland and Maples is that courts must grant relief in some way when it
finds attorney abandonment.293 Obviously, this is not entirely consistent.
The easiest way to reconcile this difference would be to create a
statutory analogue to the Supreme Court’s holdings in Holland and Maples.
The way Rule 60(b)(6) is currently written makes it seem as though courts
have the ability to decline relief to clients who were abandoned by their
attorneys.294 Some court could conceivably reference the language in
60(b)(6)—that is, the language saying a “court may relieve a party” from
judgment—to justify a ruling that it could still hold an abandoned client
liable for the acts of her attorney.295 In order to avoid such a situation and to
remain faithful to Holland and Maples, Congress should consider
implementing a permanent statutory exception that requires courts to vacate

288. See supra Part V.
289. See supra Part V.
290. See infra notes 291–301 and accompanying text.
291. Compare Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 924 (holding that abandoned clients can never be bound by
their attorney’s actions), and Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 659–60 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring)
(same), with FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(6) (granting courts the discretion to vacate judgments).
292. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(6) (emphasis added).
293. Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 924; Holland, 560 U.S. at 659–60 (Alito, J., concurring). Relief could
be granted under Rule 55(c) if the underlying judgment was a default judgment or under Rule 59 if
the underlying judgment occurred at a trial, but FRCP 60(b)(6) is the only mechanism that can
always grant relief. See supra Part V.
294. See FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(6).
295. See id. (emphasis added). Because statutory language is generally superior to case law, this
is not an entirely implausible situation.
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a judgment or order in some way if it finds that the attorney abandoned the
client. Such a statute would preclude any court from ever trying to deny
relief to an abandoned client.
Second, even though Holland and Maples definitively created an
exception for attorney abandonment, the Supreme Court did not describe in
great detail how lower courts should go about distinguishing gross
negligence from attorney abandonment.296 To be sure, all the Court said was
that attorney abandonment severs the attorney-client relationship.297 Beyond
that, it only noted evidence from the specific cases in front of it that tended
to show attorney abandonment existed.298
For instance, in Holland, Justice Alito found that abandonment existed
as “evidenced by counsel’s near-total failure to communicate with petitioner
or to respond to petitioner’s many inquiries and requests over a period of
several years.”299 Does this mean that communication between the client and
attorney is the main factor that matters in abandonment? Or could there be a
situation where a client is still in regular contact with his attorney but could
still be considered abandoned? Furthermore, Justice Alito also thought
abandonment occurred in Holland partially due to the fact that the client
“made reasonable efforts to terminate counsel due to his inadequate
representation.”300 In situations where Rule 60(b)(6) governs, does this
mean that all clients must be reasonably diligent in trying to either contact
his attorney or end the attorney’s representation, or is this factor limited to
habeas corpus petitioners alone? Granted, finding attorney abandonment is
inherently a fact-heavy analysis,301 but this is an area of law that will need to
be more fully fleshed out by the circuit courts in the near future.302 Indeed,
the Supreme Court may even find itself revisiting the topic in order to more
clearly define the differences between gross negligence and attorney
abandonment.

296. Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 923 (omitting any detailed discussion of how lower courts should go
about determining attorney abandonment); Holland, 560 U.S. at 658–60 (Alito, J., concurring)
(same).
297. Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 923–24; Holland, 560 U.S. at 658–60 (Alito, J., concurring).
298. See Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 922–24; Holland, 560 U.S. 654–60 (Alito, J., concurring).
299. Holland, 560 U.S. at 659.
300. Id.
301. Zupac, supra note 22, at 1363.
302. See supra Part VI.A–D.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Holland and Maples are
godsends for clients unfortunate enough to be burdened with attorneys who,
for one reason or another, are so lacking in their representation that their
actions cannot be fairly attributed to the client.303 Without explicitly doing
so, the Supreme Court cured a four-way circuit split in a manner that will
allow abandoned clients to be released from the shackles of any undeserved
judgments against them.304 No longer will parties to a civil lawsuit have no
recourse to turn to once their attorney’s misconduct causes them loss and
damages.305 Instead, once every circuit comes to acknowledge that Rule
60(b)(6) is always available as a remedy for attorney abandonment, these
parties will have a potential avenue for relief.306 As a result, American law
will move one small step closer toward its goal of enacting justice in
everything that it does.307 So, the next time you are in a car accident, sued
for negligence, and abandoned by your attorney, rest assured knowing that
you will not have to pay that $50,000 judgment308—unless, of course, you
were actually at fault.
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303. See supra Part III.
304. See supra Parts V–VI.
305. See supra Parts II.C.2, II.C.4.
306. See supra Parts V–VI.
307. See supra Part VII (describing some of the setbacks that might accompany this small step
forward).
308. See supra Part I.
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